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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, 
vs. ] 
MICHAEL LEWIS GREEN, AKA ] 
JAMES ALVIN DOUGLAS, ] 
Defendant-Respondent. ] 
) Case No. 900329 
i Priority No. 13 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITON FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH 
COURT OF APPEALS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant-Respondent Michael Lewis Green appealed from a final 
judgment and sentence of the Court below from two second degree 
felony crimes, manufacturing a controlled substance, and possession 
of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, to wit, P-2-P. 
The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, holding Utah 
Code Ann. Sec. 58-37-3(3) (1986) and the portion of Utah Code Ann. 
Sec. 58-37-2(4) (Supp. 1988) unconstitutional as impermissibly 
delegating State legislative functions. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant testified at trial his father had been a licensed 
pharmacist (Reporter's Transcript of Trial, vol. 2, hereinafter 
ffR2" 476), that Defendant had a lifelong hobby of raising tropical 
plants (R2 478), fertilized, sprayed, and added nutrients to the 
soil (R2 479). He had a collection of chemicals to pursue his 
chemistry hobby (R2 495). He dabbled in making sprays, plant 
growth hormone, and 20 to 30 other projects (R2 495). He made 
solar feed, fertilizer, ammonium phosphate compounds, and materials 
to change p.h. of the soil (R2 500). He had worked in the past at 
jobs where he sold chemicals, and had been an officer in a chemical 
company (R2 499). 
At trial, the State's chemist testified that over two pounds 
of P-2-P was found at the Defendant's premises (Rl 144). He 
testified that he couldn't even distinguish if, of the substance 
tested, it was 1% P-2-P or 50% (Rl 210-211), that it did not look 
like a finished product (Rl 210), but "the end of a reaction 
mixture" (Rl 210). He found no amphetamines nor methamphetamines 
(Rl 215). The State criminalist, who did chemical testing, stated 
P-2-P could've been a trace or contaminant produced while making 
something else (R2 288). 
The State says, without citation to the record, in the 
Petition for Writ, p. 4, that officers found fifteen fifty-gallon 
drums of phenylacetic acid, which overstates the amount by probably 
a magnitude of ten-fold. First, Defendant was not charged with 
possession of phenylacetic acid, which may or may not have been 
legal then. Second, the actual record says they found fifteen 
fifty-pound containers "commercially labeled" phenlylacetic acid 
(Rl 222), not P-2-P. 
ARGUMENT 
THE AUTHORITY GIVEN THE U.S. CONGRESS OR U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL 
UNDER THE UTAH CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT TO DESIGNATE, 
RESCHEDULE, OR REVISE BY ADDING, DELETING, OR TRANSFERING 
SUBSTANCES ON THE SCHEDULES IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION 
OF LEGISLATIVE POWER 
P-2-P is nowhere found or mentioned in the Utah Controlled 
Substances Act, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, Section 58-
37-1 et seq. The term "controlled substance" is defined in two 
places, Section 58-37-3 and 58-37-2 (4) (Appendix 1-6). The only 
basis that the State can claim that P-2-P is a controlled substance 
is under the theory that it is a controlled substance under the 
Federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. Section 801 et seq. 
P-2-P is not specifically mentioned in the United States Code, but, 
pursuant to rules and regulations of the United States Attorney 
General, and their listing in the Code of Federal Regulations at 21 
CFR Section 1308.12 (g), it might be a controlled substance under 
the Federal Act. It is the Defendant's position that the attempt 
to define the elements and punishment of a crime by reference to 
the United States Code, or the Code of Federal Regulations, 
promulgated pursuant to administrative rule making by the Unites 
States Attorney General, constitutes an unconstitutional delegation 
of legislative authority, and is therefore not constitutionally 
valid and P-2-P is therefore not a controlled substance under the 
Utah Controlled Substances Act. 
The Utah Court of Appeals correctly applied the Utah Supreme 
Court case directly on point, State vs. Gallion 572 P.2d 683 (Utah 
1977). Since this case has already decided the issue, there is no 
need for certiorari in the case at bar. The case involved 
prosecution of the individual for making a forged prescription for 
a controlled substance, Demerol. At that time, Demerol was not a 
scheduled controlled substance under the state statute, but had 
been scheduled by the Utah Attorney General in acccordance with the 
Controlled Substance Act. The Utah Supreme Court held that that 
was improper, that the Attorney General could not so schedule a 
substance not listed in the legislative enactment, and that said 
action constituted an unlawful and illegal delegation of 
legislative authority under both the State and Federal 
Constitution. The Court held such on the basis of two separate but 
related arguments and concerns. 
The first basis for the holding of the Court is expressed in 
the first half of the opinion, the separation of powers holding 
dealt with in the State's Petition. In the case at bar, 
Defendant's brief (which covered the point in a scant paragraph) to 
the Court of Appeals never argued separation of powers, and the 
Court of Appeals naturally dispensed with the point summarily. The 
length of argument accorded it in the State's Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari is indicative that the State would set up the separation 
of powers argument as a convenient straw man, to distract the court 
from the real issue, delegation of legislative authority. Gallion 
held, on the separation of powers ground, first, as well as the 
second ground, delegation, that it was unconstitutional for someone 
other than the legislature to determine what was a controlled 
substance, and the level of penalty therefor. 
The Supreme Court however also based its decision on the fact 
that the listing of a controlled substance under the Act, thereby 
defining an element of and the punishment for a crime, was an 
inherently legislative function that could not be delegated to 
anyone. The separate nature of this second point was made explicit 
beginning at page 687 of the opinion, where the court stated: 
ffThe other aspect of this case which merits response is 
whether the Controlled Substance Act has improperly delegated 
legislative power." 
The court stated, at page 690: 
"A determination of the elements of a crime and the 
appropriate punishment therefore are, under our Constitutional 
system, judgments, which must be made exclusively by the 
legislature." 
The Court discussed the Utah Controlled Substances Act and the 
manner in which it worked, which has not changed substantially 
since that time (with the exception of the delegation to the 
Congress or United States Attorney General, as discussed below). 
The statute has a number of different schedules, and defines the 
seriousness of various offenses involving those substances based 
upon which schedule the controlled substance is listed. Thus, what 
might be a felony to deal with a controlled substance under one 
schedule might be a misdemeanor on another. The Court discussed 
other jurisdictions which had similarly held drug statutes 
unconstitutional and distinguished the Federal case law which 
reached a decision contrary to that reached by the Utah Court in 
Gallion. In arriving at its conclusion and decision, the Court 
stated at page 689-90: 
"In the Controlled Substances Act, the administrator not 
only determines that a substance should be controlled, he 
further schedules the substance, which in effect, declares the 
magnitude of the penalty and fixes the punishment. The 
administrator is exercising an essential legislative function 
which cannot be transferred to him..." 
"There are sound reasons for ruling the definition of a 
crime and the precise punishment therefor to be an essential 
legislative function, which cannot be transferred. Criminal 
trials would be unduly complicated, for the defendant would 
have the right to challenge the administrative procedure and 
the findings where a substance has been scheduled or 
rescheduled. A similar determination by the legislature could 
not be challenged. The administrative rulings are not 
statutes and are not incorporated into the code, a person who 
wishes to abide by the law would have to resort to the 
permanent register kept by the secretary of state to determine 
the status of a substance." 
Gallion involved the Utah State Attorney General. The case at 
bar involves the United States Congress, and pursuant to its 
attempted delegation of authority, the United States Attorney 
General in his adminstrative processes. Hence, the delegation is 
even more opprobrious, as more remote, and not preserving of 
federalism. Therefore, there is no way to successfully distinguish 
the present case from Gal lion, supra, and therefore the attempted 
inclusion of P-2-P in the Utah Act as a controlled substance is 
void and without effect as being an unconstitutional delegation of 
legislative authority. 
Gal lion placed Utah in a group of states whose highest courts 
have found their state's enactment of the Controlled Substance Law 
unconstitutional. Further, the decision, as may be applied to 
incorporation of federal statutes, is in accord with a very 
respectable line of cases holding that adoption of prospective 
federal legislation or federal administrative rules constitutes an 
unconstitutional delegation of state legislative powers, especially 
where the delegation is in future ad infinitum. 
At least six states' highest appellate courts (including Utah) 
have found their state's enactment of the Controlled Substances Act 
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power: State v. 
Rodriguez, 379 So.2d 1084 (La. 1980); Howell v. State, 300 So.2d 
774 (Miss. 1974); State v. Krego, 433 N.E.2d 1298 (Ohio, 1981); 
State v. Johnson, 173 N.W.2d 894 (S.D. 1970); and In Re Powell, 602 
P.2d 711 (Wash. 1979). Additionally, the Supreme Court of Appeals 
of West Virginia found that, pertaining to its drug statute, the 
adoption of future laws (see below) of the federal government or 
its agencies is unconstitutional as an unlawful delegation of 
legislative power (State v. Grinstead, 206 S.E.2d 912 (W.Va. 1974). 
In Howell, defendant was convicted of the possession of 
amphetamines. The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the 
statute which delegated the power to the State Board of Health to 
reschedule drugs was an unconstitutional delegation of the 
legislatures power to define crimes and fix the punishment for 
them, as well as a violation of the State Constitution's separation 
of powers clause. The State Board had transferred amphetamines 
from a Schedule III drug to Schedule II, thus increasing the 
penalties. 
In Krego, an identical opinion resulted from a nearly 
identical rescheduling of the drug phencyclidine, in Ohio. 
In Powell, The Supreme Court of Washington, in reviewing a 
detention for possession of the drug Dalmane, found the legislative 
delegation to the State Board of Pharmacy unconstitutional. 
Although there is some conflict, it is generally held that the 
adoption by or under authority of a state statute of prospective 
Federal legislation, or Federal administrative rules thereafter to 
be passed, constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of 
legislative power. (This should be especially true where the item 
to be adopted would define a serious crime.) See State v. 
Intoxicating Liguors, 117 A 588 (Me. 1922) (prohibiting adoption of 
the federal determination of what is an "intoxicating" beverage). 
State v. Gauthier, 118 A 380 (Me. 1922). Holgate Bros. Co. v. 
Bashore, 200 A 672 (Pa. 1938) (prohibiting adoption of federal 
working hours in statute). Darweger v. Staats, 196 NE 61 (N.Y. 
1935), (prohibiting adoption of prospective federal enactment on 
fair competition). Santee Mills v. Query, 115 S.E. 202 (S.C. 1922) 
(prohibiting statute that state income tax be one-third of federal, 
as to future federal amendments, etc.). Dawson v. Hamilton, 314 
S.W.2d 532 (Ky. 1958) (adopting time standards to be fixed in the 
future). State v. Urguhart, 310 P.2d 261 (Wash. 1957) (prohibiting 
adoption in statute of future lists of approved medical schools). 
Wallace v. Commissioner of Taxation, 184 N.W.2d 588 (Minn. 1971) 
(invalidating subsequent federal amendments of "gross income" as 
determining state "gross income", for income tax). 
In Seale v. McKennon, 336 P.2d 340 (Ore. 1959), a statute 
requiring the Oregon State Department of Agriculture to adopt the 
minimum regulations and laws of Unites States Department of 
Agriculture, inter alia, was interpreted so as to avoid 
unconstitutionality in legislative delegation. Future 
modifications of the federal laws and regulations were deemed not 
to be included in the statute's direction. 
Thus, it is seen that it has been widely held that a 
legislature cannot delegate to Congress or a federal agency power 
to create laws in the future. 
Specifically, in the area of delegating future powers to 
schedule and designate controlled substances, cases consistent with 
the Utah position expressed in Gal lion are found in State v. 
Johnson, 173 N.W.2d 894 (S.D. 1970) and in State v. Rodriguez, 379 
So.2d 1084 (La. 1980), in which cases the state statutes 
specifically included provisions for automatic inclusion of any 
federally scheduled drug, and on that basis, the drug statute was 
found an unconstitutional delegation. In Johnson, the statute 
prohibited sale of any drug which contained any quantity of 
substance designated by regulations promulated under the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Defendant was charged with selling 
LSD, which was not specified on the statute, other than by 
reference to the federal act. The court held, at 895: 
"'Statutes adopting laws or regulations of other states, 
the federal government, or any of its agencies, effective at 
the time of adoption are valid, but attempted adoption of 
future laws, rules or regulations of other states, or of the 
federal government, or of its commission and agencies 
generally have been held unconstitutional as an unlawful 
delegation of legislative power.1" (Citations omitted.) 
"The statute does not adopt the regulations of the 
federal government or one of its agencies at a given time, but 
attempts to adopt any and all regulations and changes therein 
promulgated under the federal act in futuro ad infinitum. 
This the legislature could not constitutionally do..." 
In Rodriguez, supra, the defendant was charged with possession 
of Talwin. The State Secretary of Department of Health and Human 
Resources, pursuant to statute, added it to the list of controlled 
substances days after the Drug Enforcement Agency of the Department 
of Justice classified Talwin as a controlled substance. The court 
held, at 1087: 
"This prohibition against delegating the power to create 
crimes applies not only to a delegation to a state agency, 
such as the Deprtment of Health and Human Resources, but to 
any other agency or body, such as the Drug Enforcement 
Administration. The Louisiana legislature is not authorized 
to delegate its legislative power to a federal agency, nor to 
Congress." 
Also, Grinstead, supra, involved a conviction for possession, 
delivery and sale of the drug LSD. Until 1968, the West Virginia 
legislature had not explicitly outlawed LSD, but in 1968, Congress 
amended the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act to include LSD. West 
Virginiafs statute defined a "dangerous drug" as one described 
under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. Thereafter, the 
State Board of Pharmacy, with reference to the federal act, 
declared LSD a dangerous drug. Subsequent to this, Grinstead was 
indicted. The court held: 
"The Legislature cannot delegate its authority to enact 
criminal laws to an agency which is a unit of the exectutive 
branch of State government, nor can it, under the guise of a 
colorable delegation, permit the Board of Pharmacy to adopt a 
federal law which has not been given prior approval by the 
Legislature." 
The primary objection the Grinstead court had to the 
delegation was that it was a delegation to the federal government 
in future 
The State cites several state decisions of contrary holding, 
but only two of them deal with a delegation to the federal 
government, and two of them don't deal with the area of heavy 
felonies. The thread that runs through them is that some limited 
delegation may be allowable if the local legislature has provided 
specific standards and procedural safeguards to the delegee. The 
State has failed to, and doubtless can't, show such standards in 
Utah, especially since P-2-P was purportedly outlawed under the 21 
U.S.C. 811(e) no-findings exception (below). People v. Lowrie, 761 
P.2d 778 (Colo. 1988). Clark County Sheriff v. Lugman, 101 Nev. 
149, 697 P.2d 107 (1985). State v. Peloguin, 427 A.2d 1327 (R.I. 
1981). Montoya v. OyToole, 94 N.M. 303, 610 P.2d 190 (1980). 
State v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 92 Wash. 2d 894, 602 P.2d 1172 
(1979). It is submitted that State v. Kellogg, 98 Idaho 541, 568 
P.2d 514 (1977) is a very isolated holding, since no standards were 
required for what appears to be a startlingly open-ended 
delegation. People v. Uriel, in Petitioner's brief, is apparently 
mis-cited. 
With regard to the State's argument that a court should only 
reach the issue of constitutionality as a last resort, it must be 
considered that welded to the question of constitutionality here is 
the question of whether P-2-P was a completely legal substance or 
not. Fully three of the six issues presented to the Court of 
Appeal in Appellant's Brief confront Gallion (delegation, due 
process, jury instructions). Bearing on one of the remaining 
issues, probable cause, was whether the officers and issuing 
magistrate shouldfve known or been informed of Gallion. The 
remaining issues, destruction of chemicals and whether the 
informant was a state agent, are affected by whether the substance 
was illegal or not. 
The issue was not so much constitutionality, as Gallion had 
decided that issue long ago, but whether Gallion was directly 
controlling. Furthermore, logically the State could never prevail 
on this conviction until constitutionality was confronted, and for 
it to insist on review of side issues instead of confronting 
constitutionality is unnecessary circuity and delay, and a severe 
injustice to a man in custody awaiting decision. 
The Utah Controlled Substances Act went into effect on January 
1, 1972. Laws 1971, Ch. 145. On March 6, 1979, the legislature 
passed an amendment to the Act, which went into effect on May 8, 
1979. Laws 1979, Ch. 12. The 1979 amendment added the new 
Subsection (5) to Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, 58-37-2, 
providing: 
f,The words "controlled substance" mean a drug, substance 
or immediate precursor included in I, II, III, IV or V or 
section 58-37-4. "Controlled substance" shall also include a 
drug, substance, or immediate precursor included in schedules 
I, II, III, IV or V of the Federal Contolled Substances Act 
(Title II, P.L. 91-513), as such schedules may be revised to 
add, delete or transfer substances from one schedule to 
another, wherther by Congressional enactment or by 
administrative rule of the United States Attorney Genral 
adopeted pursuant to Section 201 of that act. The words do 
not include distilled spirits, wine, or malt beverages, as 
those terms are defined or used in Title 32, tobacco or food." 
Subsections (2) and (3) of Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended, 58-37-3, were also added, in 1979: 
"(2) All controlled substances listed in the Federal 
Controlled Substances Act (Title II, P.L. 91-513), as it is 
amended from time to time, are hereby controlled." 
"(3) Whenever any substance is designated, rescheduled 
or deleted as a controlled substance in schedules I, II, III, 
IV or V of the Federal Controlled Substances Act (Title II, 
P.L. 91-513), as such schedules may be revised by 
Congressional enactment or by administrative rule of the 
United States Attorney General adopted pursuant to section 201 
of that act, that subsequent designation, rescheduling or 
deletion shall govern." 
These subsections survive basically unchanged in our present law. 
P-2-P is not listed in the Utah Controlled Substance Act, 
explicitly. 
The Controlled Subtance Act (21 USCA 801 et seq.) was enacted 
by Congress on October 27, 1970. Section 811 (Appendix 7-11) sets 
forth the operative language for exercise of delegations to the 
Attorney General. Subsection (a) and (b) provide a means by which 
the U.S. Attorney General may add, transfer between schedules, or 
remove a drug from schedules. First, he must request a scientific 
and medical evaluation, and the Secretary's recommendations, from 
the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (now Health and 
Human Services). Then he must make findings, and follow the 
federal rulemaking procedure. 
However, 21 USCA 811(e) provides the U.S. Attorney General 
may, with regard to "immediate precursors", dispense with the 
scientific and medical evaluations, the Secretary's 
recommendations, findings, and the rulemaking procedures 
altogether. Since the requirement of findings is dispensed with, 
the protective standards, factors and guidelines of 21 U.S.C. 
811(c) are also discarded. 
On December 7, 1979, nine months after the Utah Legislature 
amended Utah Code, Sec. 58-37-2, and 58-27-3, seven months after 
they went into effect, and almost eight years after the initial 
Utah enactment of 58-37-2 (which contained--in Subsection 23--
references to the U.S. Attorney General making findings and 
designations as to precursors), the U.S. Attorney General 
designated P-2-P as a "precursor", and amended Title 21, Section 
1308.12, to add a new subsection "f", which caused P-2-P, also 
known as phenylacetone, to be included in Schedule II of the 
Federal Act. He added P-2-P under 21 USCA 811(e), which allowed 
him to dispense with, and which he used to discard, scientific and 
medical evaluation, the Secretary's recommendations, findings, and 
the federal rulemaking procedures. (See Appendix 13, last 
paragraph, first column.) 
The effective date of the criminal prohibition of P-2-P was 
even later, February 11, 1980. Federal Register, volume 44, No. 
240, page 71824. (Appendix, 12-14.) 
Unquestionably, the Utah Legislature purportedly delegated the 
power to the U.S. Attorney General in May 1979 (or earlier) to make 
future additions to the controlled substance schedules, and P-2-P 
was added by the Attorney General subsequent to the delegation by 
the Utah Legislature, on December 7, 1979, effective February 11, 
1980. As such, it was a purported delegation in futuro ad 
infinitum, and unconstitutional. 
Defendant raised these issues pre-trial (Reporter's Trial 
Transcript vol. 1, hereinafter "Rl", 30-45) and at the end of the 
State's evidence, when Defendant moved for a directed verdict 
(Reporter's Trial Transcript vol. 2, hereinafter "R2" 425), but 
they were denied (Rl 45, R2 432-3). 
An unfortunate corollary to the improper delegation of power 
by the legislature here is that, by forcing a continual search of 
the Code of Federal Regulations and Federal Register, it leads tc a 
deprivation of due process rights to notice of proscribed conduct. 
Looking to the Utah statute for guidance, a person would not find 
P-2-P, and would only find vague words such as "controlled 
substance". Grinstead, ibid, at 915, and 918, alludes to this 
problem, but is unclear as to whether it is a ratio decendis. 
State v. Johnson, 173 N.W.2d 894, at 895, alludes to it, in 
passing. In State v. Dougall, 570 P.2d 137 (Wash.), at 138, the 
court concluded: 
"[i]t is unreasonable to expect an average person to 
continually research the Federal Register to adetermine what 
drugs are controlled substances under RCW 69.50." 
This is similar to the objected-to register in Gallion, p. 690. 
His Honor, Judge Low, having heard the evidence, commented on the 
problem (R2 431-2): 
"I think it's a disconcerting issue. As to notice and 
fairness, I am aware the language in the Gal lion case which 
raises that concern and issue. And I suppose it's most 
bothersome to the court, to the defendant's ability to be put 
on notice of changes in the federal legislation by the method 
prescribed in the federal legislation. And the defendant's or 
any defendant's ability to become aware of those kind of 
changes." 
Gallion, at 688, cites the preference in Utah for crimes to be 
stated in the state statutes: 
"In State v. Johnson (44 Utah 18, 26, 137 P. 632 (1913)) 
this court held that under the Constitution, the courts may 
not denounce and punish as crimes acts and omissions not made 
punishable by statute, for it is a legislative power to 
declare acts as crimes and to prescribe proper penalties." 
"The consititutional standard set forth in State v. 
Johnson is incorporated in the Utah Criminal Code. Section 
76-1-105, as enacted in 1973, amended 1974, provides:" 
"Common law crimes are abolished and no conduct is a 
crime unless made so by this code, other applicable 
statute or ordinance." 
Defendant raised this issue in his motion for directed verdict 
(R2-426), and pre-trial (Rl 30-45), but it was denied (Rl 45, R2 
432-3). 
Furthermore, the statutes invite the court to deprive 
Defendants of jury instructions that the prosecution must prove 
administrative compliance in enacting the delegated prohibitions. 
In Gallion, at 689, the Court held: 
"There are sound reasons for ruling the definition of a 
crime and the precise punishment therefor to be essential 
legislative functions, which cannot be transferred. Criminal 
trials would be unduly complicated, for the defendant would 
have the right to challenge the administrative procedure and 
the findings where a substance has been scheduled or 
rescheduled." 
Defendant tendered Jury Instruction No. 1 to the court 
(Appendix, 15, 16), in compliance with this holding in Gallion. It 
simply set forth the pertinent requirements of 21 DSCA 811. The 
court declined to give the instruction, and counsel for Defendant 
stated his objections to the failure (R2 518-9). Further, counsel 
for Defendant objected to the giving of Instruction No. 5 
(Appendix, 17, R2 521), which implicitly and erroneously assumes 
the premise of what the jury would have been required to find, viz. 
that P-2-P was a controlled substance. Nonetheless, the court gave 
instruction No. 5. As a result, the Defendant was denied the right 
to "challenge the administrative procedure and the findings" 
(Gallion, ibid, at 689), to his serious prejudice. 
Citing federal cases, the State reminds us that there is ample 
federal authority for the delegation by the federal Congress to 
U.S. Attorney General. However, this misses the point entirely, 
since federal delegation to federal government misses the entire 
federalism problem raised when a state legislature, elected by a 
local electorate, delegates to an unelected national official, 
appointed by the President. Worse, the case at bar involves an 
exercise of delegation proscribing P-2-P by the U.S. Attorney 
General, dispensing with all rulemaking and standards by virtue of 
21 USCA 811(e), on his mere fiat. The cited federal-to-federal 
authority, in any event, even if it dealt with state delegation, 
would not overturn Gallion. 
For the first time in this case, in its brief at the Court of 
Appeal (pp. 27, 31, and 32 of the Brief of Respondent, below), and 
now here (p. 9 of Petition) the State apparently contends that P-2-
P was an illegal drug under Utah law alone, without reference to 
federal law, as a "precursor". The argument is that Utah Code Ann. 
Sec. 58-37-2(4) (Supp. 1988), in pertinent part, defines the term 
"control 1ed subtance" 
"means a drug, substance, or immediate precursor included 
in schedules I, II, III, IV, or V of Section 58-37-4, and also 
includes a drug, substance or immediate precursor included in 
Schedules I, II, III, IV or V of the federal Controlled 
Substances Act...as those schedules may be revised to add..." 
Presumably, the State infers that because the words "immediate 
precursor" were used in the statute above, that, if P-2-P were in 
chemical fact an immediate precursor, that it is thereby included, 
though not named. Under the obvious meaning of the statute, 
"immediate precursors" as such are no more outlawed generically nor 
specifically than are "drugs" or "substances" (words used in the 
same phrase) as such, and the language cannot be stripped away from 
the language "included in", etc, that follows. "...[D]rug, 
substance, or immediate precursor" is modified by "included in 
Schedules I, II, III, IV, or V of Section 58-37-4...". That is, it 
includes only immediate precursors named in 58-37-4. P-2-P is not 
named in the Utah Act. 
The State's argument also ignores Sec. 58-37-2(16): 
"'Immediate precursor' means a substance which the 
Attorney General of the United States has found to be, and by 
regulation designated as being, the principal compound used or 
produced primarily for use in the manufacture of a controlled 
substance, or which is an immediate chemical intermediary used 
or likly to be used in the manufacture of a controlled 
subtance, the control of which is necessary to prevent, 
curtail, or limit the manufacture of the controlled 
substance." 
To recap, the State, despite the fact it failed to try the 
case on the theory that P-2-P was a precursor described in the Utah 
Code, and flying in the face of the fact the jury instructions 
assumed the very fact in issue (Instruction 5--Appendix 17--
informed the jury P-2-P "is a controlled substance", rather than 
asking the jury to determine if it was), asserts P-2-P is a 
controlled subtance because it is a precursor under state law 
alone. But the state law definition of "precursor" is, a substance 
the U.S. Attorney General has designated. The agrument begs the 
question. In short, "immediate precursor" cannot be determined 
without delegation to federal laws, in futuro ad infinitum. 
Without reference to federal law, there is no State "precursor", by 
definition. 
The State would convince us that Defendant violated Section 
58-37-4(2)(b)(iii)(A) and (B). Those sections read: 
"(2) Schedules I, II, III, IV, and V shall consist of 
the following drugs or other substances, by whatever official 
name, common or usual name, chemical name or brand name 
designated: 
(b) Schedule II: 
(iii) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in 
another schedule, any material, compound, mixture or 
preparation which contains any quantity of the following 
substances having a stimulant effect on the central nervous 
system: 
(A) Amphetamine, its salts, optical isomers, and salts 
of its optical isomers 
(B) Methamphetamine, its salts, isomers, and salts of 
its isomers" 
Nothing here states a precursor is a salt, isomer, or salt of 
its isomer. Counsel knows of no evidence or issue put on at trial 
that P-2-P was a salt, isomer, or salt of isomer, or amphetamine or 
methamphetamine. 
What is clear is that the case went to the jury on 
instructions, not that they were to determine if P-2-P was a 
precursor, or a salt, isomer, or salt of isomer, but simply that it 
was a controlled substance. Instruction SA-2 provided, in part, 
the elements the prosecution had to prove were as follows: 
"1. That on or about 1987 or 1988, in Box Elder County, 
State of Utah; 
2. That the Defendant did, knowingly and intentionally; 
3. Manufacture; 
4. A controlled substance, to-wit, P-2-P." 
Instructions 3 and 4 are to the same effect, the difference 
being merely between possession vs. manufacture. Defendant was not 
tried on manufacture of a "salt", nor of a "precursor", but of a 
specifically-named chemical in the federal lists, P-2-P. 
Defendant raised the Gal lion/federal delegation issue 
generally, at pre-trial (Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, 30-45), and at 
the end of the State's evidence, when Defendant moved for directed 
verdict (R2 425), but Gallion-concerned motions were denied (Trial 
Transcript vol. 1 p. 45, R2 431-3). (Transcript Vol. 1, page 39.) 
Conclusion 
Since Utah has already decided that delegations of legislative 
responsibility to define felony crimes pertaining to controlled 
substances, and to fashion punishments therefore, is an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, and since the 
addition of P-2-P was done after the enactment of the statute, the 
incorporation of P-2-P into the Utah statute was unconstitutional, 
as a delegation, and worse, as a delegation in futuro ad infinitum. 
The convoluted means of incorporating future laws, as was used 
in the purported enactment of the P-2-P inclusion, fails to give 
notice to persons, sufficient to assure their due process rights, 
and as such is vague and confusing. 
The case was not tried on a precursor basis, the court simply 
instructing that P-2-P was a controlled substance- The notion that 
P-2-P was proscribed by Utah law as an "immediate precursor" 
without reference to federal delegation appears for the first time, 
to the knowledge of the author, at the appellate level, and is 
patently unfounded, given the plain words of the statute at Section 
58-37-2(4), and the definition of "immediate precursor" at 58-37-
2(16), which defines it as being designated or found to be such by 
the U.S. Attorney General, the very point at issue. He in turn, 
enacted the prohibition under 21 U.S.C. 811(e), without standards. 
Wherefore, Defendants asks the court to deny the petition for 
writ of certiorari. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day off A^gu^f Jl/$0. 
DANISiTR. KITOWLTON 
Attorney for 
Defendant-Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
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delivered four copies of the foregoing Response to Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari to Office of Attorney Genera/, 236 State Capitol 
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CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 58-37-2 
(7) unethical conduct as defined in the code of ethics adopted and pub-
lished by the National Association of Social Workers. 
History: L. 1971, ch. 138, § 11; 1977, ch. 
32, § 6; 1985, ch. 187, § 78; 1987, ch. 27, § 9. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment substituted "licensee" for "person" in the 
first sentence in the introductory paragraph, 
inserted "clinical social worker" and "or as a 
member of any other health care profession" in 
Subsection (3), inserted "falsely" in Subsection 
(4), and made other minor changes. 
CHAPTER 37 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 
Sunset Act — Section 63-55-7 provides that Chapter 37, Title 58 is terminated on July 1, 
1997. 
Section 
58-37-2. 
58-37-2.5. 
58-37-4. 
58-37-6. 
Definitions. 
Practices of non-allopathic practi-
tioners, herbalists, and mas-
sage therapists and use of herbs 
and food supplements of vegeta-
ble origin not restricted. 
Schedules of controlled sub-
stances — Schedules I through 
V — Findings required — Spe-
cific substances included in 
schedules. 
License to manufacture, produce, 
distribute, dispense, adminis-
ter, or ..conduct research — Issu-
Section 
58-37-8. 
58-37-9. 
58-37-10. 
58-37-13. 
58-37-17. 
ance by department — Denial, 
suspension, or revocation — 
Records required — Prescrip-
tions. 
Prohibited acts — Penalties. 
Investigators — Status of peace 
officers. 
Search warrants — Administra-
tive inspection warrants — In-
spections and seizures of prop-
erty without warrant. 
Property subject to forfeiture — 
Seizure — Procedure. 
Judicial review. 
58-37-1. Short title — "Utah Controlled Substances Act." 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — When may offender found guilty of 
multiple crimes under Comprehensive D ug 
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (21 
USCS §§ 841-851) be punished for only one of-
fense, 80 A.L.R. Fed. 794. 
58-37-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Administer" means the direct application of a controlled sub-
stance, whether by injection, inhalation, ingestion, or any other means, to 
the body of a patient or research subject by: 
(a) a practitioner or, in his presence, by his authorized agent; or 
(b) the patient or research subject at the direction and in the pres-
ence of the practitioner. 
(2) "Agent" means an authorized person who acts on behalf of or at the 
direction of a manufacturer, distributor, or practitioner but does not in-
clude a common or contract carrier, public warehouseman, or employee of 
any of them. 
(3) "Control" means to add, remove, or change the placement of a drug, 
substance, or immediate precursor under Section 58-37-3. 
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(4) "Controlled substance" means a drug, substance, or immediate pre-
cursor included in schedules I, II, III, IV, or V of Section 58-37-4, and also 
includes a drug, substance, or immediate precursor included in schedules 
I, II, III, IV, or V of the federal Controlled Substances Act, Title II, P.L. 
91-513, as those schedules may be revised to add, delete, or transfer sub-
stances from one schedule to another, whether by Congressional enact-
ment or by administrative rule of the United States Attorney General 
adopted under Section 201 of that act. Controlled substance does not 
include distilled spirits, wine, or malt beverages, as those terms are de-
fined or used in Title 32A, regarding tobacco or food. 
(5) "Counterfeit substance" means: 
(a) any substance or container or labeling of any substance that 
without authorization bears the trademark, trade name, or other 
identifying mark, imprint, number, device, or any likeness of them, 
of a manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser other than the person or 
persons who in fact manufactured, distributed, or dispensed the sub-
stance which falsely purports to be a controlled substance distributed 
by, any other manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser; or 
(b) any substance that is represented to be a controlled substance. 
(6) "Deliver" or "delivery" means the actual, constructive, or attempted 
transfer of a controlled substance or a listed chemical, whether or not an 
agency relationship exists. 
(7) "Department" means the Department of Commerce. 
(8) "Depressant or stimulant substance" means: 
(a) a drug which contains any quantity of: 
(i) barbituric acid or any of the salts of barbituric acid; or 
(ii) any derivative of barbituric acid which has been desig-
nated by the secretary as habit-forming under Section 502(d) of 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 352(d)); 
(b) a drug which contains any quantity of: 
(i) amphetamine or any of its optical isomers; 
(ii) any salt of amphetamine or any salt of an optical isomer of 
amphetamine; or 
(iii) any substance which the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services or the Attorney General of the United States after in-
vestigation has found and by regulation designated habit-form-
ing because of its stimulant effect on the central nervous system; 
or 
(c) lysergic acid diethylamide; 
(d) any drug which contains any quantity of a substance which the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services or the Attorney General of 
the United States after investigation has found to have, and by regu-
lation designated as having, a potential for abuse because of its de-
pressant or stimulant effect on the central nervous system or its 
hallucinogenic effect. 
(9) "Dispense" or "prescribe" means the delivery of a controlled sub-
stance by a pharmacist to an ultimate user pursuant to the lawful order of 
a practitioner, and includes distributing to, leaving with, giving away, or 
disposing of that substance as well as the packaging, labeling, or com-
pounding necessary to prepare the substance for delivery. 
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(10) "Dispenser" means a pharmacist who dispenses a controlled sub-
stance. 
(11) "Distribute" means to deliver other than by administering or dis-
pensing a controlled substance or a listed chemical. 
(12) "Distributor" means a person who distributes controlled sub-
stances. 
(13) "Drug" means: 
(a) articles recognized in the official United States Pharmacopoeia, 
Official Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States, or Official 
National Formulary, or any supplement to any of them; 
(b) articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, 
treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals; 
(c) articles, other than food, intended to affect the structure or 
function of man or other animals; and 
(d) articles intended for use as a component of any articles speci-
fied in Subsection (a), (b), or (c); but does not include devices or their 
components, parts, or accessories. 
(14) "Drug dependent person" means any individual who unlawfully 
and habitually uses any controlled substance to endanger the public 
morals, health, safety, or welfare, or who is so dependent upon the use of 
controlled substances as to have lost the power of self-control with refer-
ence to his dependency. 
(15) "Food" means: 
(a) any nutrient or substance of plant, mineral, or animal origin 
other than a drug as specified in this chapter, and normally ingested 
by human beings; and 
(b) foods for special dietary uses as exist by reason of a physical, 
physiological, pathological, or other condition including but not lim-
ited to the conditions of disease, convalescence, pregnancy, lactation, 
allergy, hypersensitivity to food, underweight, and overweight; uses 
for supplying a particular dietary need which exist by reason of age 
including but not limited to the ages of infancy and childbirth, and 
also uses for supplementing and for fortifying the ordinary or un-
usual diet with any vitamin, mineral, or other dietary property for 
use of a food. Any particular use of a food is a special dietary use 
regardless of the nutritional purposes. 
(16) "Immediate precursor" means a substance which the Attorney 
General of the United States has found to be, and by regulation desig-
nated as being, the principal compound used or produced primarily for 
use in the manufacture of a controlled substance, or which is an immedi-
ate chemical intermediary used or likely to be used in the manufacture of 
a controlled substance, the control of which is necessary to prevent, cur-
tail, or limit the manufacture of the controlled substance. 
(17) "Manufacture" means the production, preparation, propagation, 
compounding, or processing of a controlled substance, either directly or 
indirectly by extraction from substances of natural origin, or indepen-
dently by means of chemical synthesis or by a combination of extraction 
and chemical synthesis. 
(18) "Manufacturer" includes any person who packages, repackages, or 
labels any container of any controlled substance, except pharmacists who 
241 
58-37-2 OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 
dispense or compound prescription orders for delivery to the ultimate 
consumer. 
(19) "Marijuana" means all species of the genus Cannabis and all parts 
of the genus , whether growing or not; the secvls of it; the resin extracted 
from any part of the plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, deriv-
ative, mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds, or resin. The term 
does not include the mature stalks of the plant, fiber produced from the 
stalks, oil or cake made from the seeds of the plant, any other compound, 
manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the mature 
stalks, except the resin extracted from them, fiber, oil or cake, or the 
sterilized seed of the plant which is incapable of germination. Any syn-
thetic equivalents of the substances contained in the plant Cannabis sa-
tiva or any other species of the genus Cannabis which are chemically 
indistinguishable and pharmacologically active are also included. 
(20) "Money" means officially issued coin and currency of the United 
States or any foreign country. 
(21) "Narcotic drug" means any of the following, whether produced 
directly or indirectly by extraction from substances of vegetable origin, or 
independently by means of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of 
extraction and chemical synthesis: 
(a) opium, coca leaves, and opiates; 
(b) a compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, or preparation of 
opium, coca leaves, or opiates; 
(c) opium poppy and poppy straw; or 
(d) a substance, and any compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, 
or preparation of the substance, which is chemically identical with 
any of the substances referred to in Subsection (a), (b), or (c), except 
narcotic drug does not include decocainized coca leaves or extracts of 
coca leaves which do not contain cocaine or ecgonine. 
(22) "Negotiable instrument" means documents, containing an uncon-
ditional promise to pay a sum of money, which are legally transferable to 
another party by endorsement or delivery. 
(23) "Opiate" means any drug or other substance having an addiction-
forming or addiction-sustaining liability similar to morphine or being 
capable of conversion into a drug having addiction-forming or addiction-
sustaining liability. 
(24) "Opium poppy" means the plant of the species Papaver somnif-
erum L., except the seeds of the plant. 
(25) "Person" means any corporation, association, partnership, trust, 
other institution or entity or one or more individuals. 
(26) "Poppy straw" means all parts, except the seeds, of the opium 
poppy, after mowing. 
(27) "Possession" or "use" means the joint or individual ownership, 
control, occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, obtaining, 
or the application, inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption, as 
distinguished from distribution, of controlled substances and includes in-
dividual, joint, or group possession or use of controlled substances. For a 
person to be a possessor or user of a controlled substance, it is not re-
quired that he be shown to have individually possessed, used, or con-
trolled the substance, but it is sufficient if it is shown that he jointly 
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participated with one or more persons in the use, possession, or control of 
any substances with knowledge that the activity was occurring. 
(28) "Practitioner" means a physician, dentist, veterinarian, pharma-
cist, scientific investigator, pharmacy, hospital, or other person licensed, 
registered, or otherwise permitted to distribute, dispense, conduct re-
search with respect to, administer, or use in teaching or chemical analysis 
a controlled substance in the course of professional practice or research in 
this state. 
(29) "Proceeds" means whatever is received when an object is sold, 
exchanged, or otherwise disposed of. 
(30) "Production" means the manufacture, planting, cultivation, grow-
ing, or harvesting of a controlled substance. 
(31) "Securities" means any stocks, bonds, notes, or other evidences of 
debt or of property, 
(32) "State" means Utah. 
(33) "Ultimate user" means any person who lawfully possesses a con-
trolled substance for his own use, for the use of a member of his house-
hold, or for administration to an animal owned by him or a member of his 
household. 
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, § 2; 1977, ch. 29, 
§ 3; 1979, ch. 12, § 1; 1981, ch. 75, § 1; 1982, 
ch. 12, § 1; 1987, ch. 190, § 1; 1989, ch. 50, 
§ 1; 1989, ch. 186, § 1; 1989, ch. 225, § 60. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment alphabetized the definitions and renum-
bered the subsections accordingly; in Subsec-
tion (5), designated the existing language as 
Subsection (a), added Subsection (b), and, in 
Subsection (a), deleted "controlled" preceding 
the first two instances of "substance" and sub-
stituted "falsely purports to be a controlled 
substance" for "thereby falsely purports or is 
represented to be the product of, or to have 
been"; deleted a definition of "Distribute for 
value" contained in former Subsection (8); de-
leted "far" preceding "dependent" in Subsec-
tion (14); deleted the former undesignated 
paragraph at the end of this section, which 
read "This act does not infringe upon the rights 
of citizens to purchase and use herbs and food 
supplements of vegetable origin and does not 
restrict the non-allopathic practitioners, the 
herbalist, the massage therapists"; and made 
minor changes in phraseology throughout the 
section. 
Distribution. 
The evidence was sufficient to support a con-
viction for distribution of a controlled sub-
stance where the defendant, who was ap-
proached with a request to seH marijuana to a 
police officer, agreed, quoted the selling price, 
The 1989 amendment by Chapter 225, effec-
tive March 14, 1989, substituted "Department 
of Commerce" for "Department of Business 
Regulation" in Subsection (7) and "Health and 
Human Services" for "Health, Education and 
Welfare" in Subsections (8)(b)(iii) and (8)(d). 
The 1989 amendment by Chapter 186, effec-
tive April 1, 1989, inserted "or a listed chemi-
cal" in Subsections (6) and (11) and corrected a 
typographical error in Subsection (8). 
The 1989 amendment by Chapter 50, effec-
tive April 24, 1989, substituted "species of the 
genus Cannabis and all parts of the genus" for 
"parts of the plant cannabis sativa L." near the 
beginning of the first sentence and inserted "or 
any other species of the genus Cannabis" in the 
last sentence of Subsection (19) and made a 
stylistic change in Subsection (33). 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Federal law. — The federal Controlled Sub-
stances Act, cited in Subsection (4), is codified 
as 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. Section 201 of the 
Act is 21 U.S.C. § 811. 
and then personally delivered the contraband 
and received the money at his apartment; he 
did not merely find, direct, and introduce the 
officer to another drug dealer. State v. Fixel, 
744 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1987). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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(27) to (30); and designated former Subsection Mean ing of " th i s ac t " . — See the note un-
(27) as the last paragraph. der the same caichline following S 58-37-1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Delivery. 
Distribution. 
Incomplete sale. 
"Production." 
Delivery. not take place, although the evidence was suf-
The definition for delivery makes it clear ficient to support a conviction for the lesser 
that agency is not to be considered in finding offense of at tempt to distribute a controlled 
criminal culpability under the Controlled Sub- substance. State v. Devlin, 699 P.2d 717 (Utah 
stances Act. State v. Casias, 567 P.2d 1097 1985) 
(Utah 1977). 
"Production." 
Distribution. T ^ e c o o k ing and adding of chemicals to the 
There was no distribution by the defendant
 m a r i j u a n a p l a n t i n a n e f f o r t t o p r o d u c e « n a s h ;> 
where an undercover police.agent gave man-
 a m Q r e ^ a n d c o n c e n t r a t e d f o r m o f m a r i . 
}?f?l o°, V ^ n ^ i n d i a ^ o ^ t e V ' S o r o u s h i r n ' juana, was sufficient to indicate defendants in-571 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1977). { ^
 t o e n g a g e i n ^ p r o c e s s i n g o f a c o n . 
Incomplete sale. trolled substance directly or indirectly by ex-
Where defendant agreed to sell cocaine to an traction from substances of natural origin and 
undercover agent, and the parties then pro- to sustain a conviction for possession with in-
ceeded, with the cocaine, to another location in tent to produce or manufacture a controlled 
order that the agent could obtain money for the substance. State v. Horsley, 596 P.2d 661 
purchase, a distribution of cocaine for value did (Utah 1979). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 25 Am. Jur . 2d Drugs, Nar- Key N u m b e r s . — Drugs and Narcotics «= 
cotics, and Poisons & 7 et seq. 42; Poisons «=> 2. 
C.J.S. — 72 C.J.S. Poisons § 1. 
58-37-3. Substances which are controlled — Revised fed-
eral schedules govern. 
(1) All controlled substances listed in § 58-37-4 are hereby controlled. 
(2) All controlled substances listed in the Federal Controlled Substances 
Act (Title II, P.L. 91-513), as it is amended from time to time, are hereby 
controlled. 
(3) Whenever any substance is designated, rescheduled or deleted as a con-
trolled substance in schedules I, II, III, IV or V of the Federal Controlled 
Substances Act (Title II, P.L. 91-513), as such schedules may be revised by 
Congressional enactment or by administrative rule of the United States At-
torney General adopted pursuant to § 201 of that act, that subsequent desig-
nation, rescheduling or deletion shall govern. 
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, § 3; 1979, ch. 12, 
§ 2. 
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bis plant, consequently, in prosecution for pos-
session of marijuana, prosecution need not prove 
that substance found in defendant's possession 
consisted of proscribed portions of Cannabis 
plant United States v Span (1975, CA10 Kan) 
515 F2d 579 
To extent hashish contains THC it is con-
trolled substance under 21 USCS §802(15) 
United States v Kelly (1976, CA9 Idaho) 527 
F2d 961 
District Court did not err in instructing jury 
that 21 USCS § 802(15), which defines marijuana 
as plant cannabis sativa L, comprehends other 
forms of plant and prohibits possession of all 
varieties of marijuana United States v Gagnon 
(1980, CA10 Okla) 635 F2d 766, cert den 451 
US 1018, 69 L Ed 2d 390, 101 S Ct 3008 
21 USCS §802(15) outlaws all species of 
marijuana containing tetrahydrocannabinol 
United States v Lupo (CA7 Wis) 652 F2d 723, 
cerr den 457 VS 1135, 13 L Ed 2d 1353, 102 S 
Ct 2964) 
Congress intended inclusion of indicia vanety 
within definition of marijuana United States v 
Moore (1970, ED Pa) 330 F Supp 684, affd 
(CA3 Pa) 446 F2d 448, cert den 406 US 909, 31 
L Ed 2d 820, 92 S Ct 1617 
8. "Narcotic drug" 
Definition of "narcotic drugs" as used in 
predecessor to this section included cocaine 
Lastra Padilla v United States (1960, CA5 Fla) 
278 F2d 188 
Legislative history of 21 USCS § 802(15) indi-
cates definition of marijuana was intended to 
only include those parts of manjuana which 
contain tetrahydrocannabinol Thomas v United 
States (1976, Dist Col App) 352 A2d 390 
Definition of marijuana as Cannabis sativa 
within meaning of 21 USCS §802(15) includes 
all Cannabis, even though Cannabis sativa is 
only one of several species of manjuana People 
v Riddle (1975) 65 Mich App 433, 237 NW2d 
491 
Percodan tablets containing one per cent of 
"dihydrohydroxycodemone hydrochloride" com-
monly called codeinone, were narcotics within 
meaning of predecessor to this section Rivas v 
United States (1966, CA9 Cal) 368 F2d 703, cert 
den 386 US 945, 17 L Ed 2d 875, 87 S Ct 980 
and (disagreed with United States v Himmel-
wnght (CA5 Fla) 551 F2d 991, cert den 434 US 
902, 54 L Ed 2d 189, 98 S Ct 298) 
Congress has perogative to classify cocaine, 
which is non-narcotic central nervous system 
stimulent, as narcotic for penalty and regulatory 
purposes United States v Stieren (1979, CA8 
Iowa) 608 F2d 1135 
Combined effect of statutory definitions of 
"dispense" and "practitioner" is to limit mean-
ing of "dispense" to delivery of controlled sub-
stances by physician acting in course of profes-
sional practice or research, delivery of controlled 
substances outside course of professional practice 
or research constitutes "distributing", which vio-
lates 21 USCS § 841(a)(1), even if earned on by 
registered physician United States v Badia 
(1973, CA1 Mass) 490 F2d 296 (disagreed with 
United States v Genser (CA10 Colo) 710 F2d 
1426) 
Although statutory definition of "narcotic 
drug" is broader than dictionary definition. Con-
gress need not follow latter in applying term to 
number of different classes of drugs for purposes 
of legal control, classification of cocaine within 
definition of "narcotic drug" under 21 USCS 
§802(16) is not arbitrary and irrational United 
States v Di Laura (1974, DC Mass) 394 F Supp 
770 
9. "Practitioner" 
"Osteopathic physicians" in Kansas were not 
"physicians " Burke v Kansas State Osteopathic 
Asso, Inc (1940, CA10 Kan) 111 F2d 250 
Doctor who acts other than in course of 
professional practice is not practitioner under 
Controlled Substance Act and is therefore not 
authonzed to presence controlled substances and 
is subject to cnminal provisions of act United 
States v Rosenberg (1975, CA9 Cal) 515 F2d 
190, 33 ALR Fed 196, cert den 423 US 1031, 46 
L Ed 2d 404, 96 S Ct 562 and (disagreed with 
United States v Genser (CalO Colo) 710 F2d 
1426) 
Osteopath was "physician " Hostetler v Wood-
worth (1928, DC Mich) 28 F2d 1003 
10. "Ultimate user" 
Term "ultimate user" includes person who has 
obtained drug for his own use, it does not 
require that he in fact use it therefor Umted 
States v Bartee (1973, CA10 Colo) 479 F2d 484 
11. "United States" 
Suitcase containing cocaine which had been 
abandoned on luggage carousel at Miami Airport 
had been imported into "United States" within 
meaning of 21 USCS § 802(26) United States v 
Catano (1977, CA5 Fla) 553 F2d 497, 2 Fed 
Rules Evid Serv 73, cert den 434 US 865, 54 L 
Ed 2d 140, 98 S Ct 199 
106 
DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION 21 USCS § 811 
§ 803. [Repealed] 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
This section (Act Oct. 27, 1970, P. L. 91-513, Title II, Part A, § 103, 
84 Stat. 1245) was repealed by Act Oct. 18, 1977, P. L. 95-137, § 1(b), 
91 Stat. 1169. This section authonzed the Bureau of Narcotics and 
Dangerous Drugs to add 300 agents and necessary supporting person-
nel. 
AUTHORITY TO CONTROL; STANDARDS AND SCHEDULES 
§ 811. Authority and criteria for classification of substances 
(a) Rules and regulations of Attorney General; hearing. The Attorney 
General shall apply the provisions of this title to the controlled substances 
listed in the schedules established by section 202 of this title [21 USCS 
§ 812] and to any other drug or other substance added to such schedules 
under this title. Except as provided in subsections (d) and (e), the Attorney 
General may by rule— 
(1) add to such a schedule or transfer between such schedules any drug 
or other substance if he— 
(A) finds that such drug or other substance has a potential for abuse, 
and 
(B) makes with respect to such drug or other substance the findings 
prescribed by subsection (b) of section 202 [21 USCS § 812(b)] for the 
schedule in which such drug is to be placed; or 
(2) remove any drug or other substance from the schedules if he finds 
that the drug or other substance does not meet the requirements for 
inclusion in any schedule. 
Rules of the Attorney General under this subsection shall be made on the 
record after opportunity for a hearing pursuant to the rulemaking proce-
dures prescnbed by subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5 of the United 
States Code [5 USCS §§551 et seq.]. Proceedings for the issuance, 
amendment, or repeal of such rules may be initiated by the Attorney 
General (1) on his own motion, (2) at the request of the Secretary, or (3) 
on the petition of any interested party. 
(b) Evaluation of drugs and other substances. The Attorney General shall, 
before initiating proceedings under subsection (a) to control a drug or 
other substance or to remove a drug or other substance entirely from the 
schedules, and after gathenng the necessary data, request from the Secre-
tary a scientific and medical evaluation, and his recommendations, as to 
whether such drug or other substance should be so controlled or removed 
as a controlled substance. In making such evaluation and recommenda-
tions, the Secretary shall consider the factors listed in paragraphs (2), (3), 
(6), (7), and (8) of subsection (c) and any scientific or medical considera-
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tions involved in paragraphs (1), (4), and (5) of such subsection The 
recommendations of the Secretary shall include recommendations with 
respect to the appropriate schedule, if any, under which such drug or other 
substance should be listed The evaluation and the recommendations of the 
Secretary shall be made in wnting and submitted to the Attorney General 
within a reasonable time The recommendations of the Secretary to the 
Attorney General shall be binding on the Attorney General as to such 
scientific and medical matters, and if the Secretary recommends that a 
drug or other substance not be controlled, the Attorney General shall not 
control the drug or other substance If the Attorney General determines 
that these facts and all other relevant data constitute substantial evidence 
of potential for abuse such as to warrant control or substantial evidence 
that the drug or other substance should be removed entirely from the 
schedules, he shall initiate proceedings for control or removal, as the case 
may be, under subsection (a) 
(c) Factors determinative of control or removal from schedules. In making 
any finding under subsection (a) of this section or under subsection (b) of 
section 202 [21 USCS § 812(b)], the Attorney General shall consider the 
following factors with respect to each drug or other substance proposed to 
be controlled or removed from the schedules 
(1) Its actual or relative potential for abuse 
(2) Scientific evidence of its pharmacological effect, if known 
(3) The state of current scientific knowledge regarding the drug or other 
substance 
(4) Its history and current pattern of abuse 
(5) The scope, duration, and significance of abuse 
(6) What, if any, risk there is to the public health 
(7) Its psychic or physiological dependence liability 
(8) Whether the substance is an immediate precursor of a substance 
already controlled under this title 
(d) International treaties, conventions, and protocols requiring control; 
procedures respecting changes in drug schedules of Convention on 
Psychotropic Substances. (1) If control is required by United States 
obligations under international treaties, conventions, or protocols in 
effect on the effective date of this part, the Attorney General shall issue 
an order controlling such drug under the schedule he deems most 
appropriate to carry out such obligations, without regard to the findings 
required by subsection (a) of this section or section 202(b) [21 USCS 
§ 812(b)] and without regard to the procedures prescribed by subsections 
(a) and (b) of this section 
(2)(A) Whenever the Secretary of State receives notification from the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations that information has been 
transmitted by or to the World Health Organization, pursuant to 
article 2 of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, which may 
108 
DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION 21 USCS § 811 
justify adding a drug or other substance to one of the schedules of the 
Convention, transferring a drug or substance from one schedule to 
another, or deleting it from the schedules, the Secretary of State shall 
immediately transmit the notice to the Secretary of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare [Secretary of Health and Human Services] who 
shall publish it in the Federal Register and provide opportunity to 
interested persons to submit to him comments respecting the scientific 
and medical evaluations which he is to prepare respecting such drug 
or substance The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare 
[Secretary of Health and Human Services] shall prepare for transmis-
sion through the Secretary of State to the World Health Organization 
such medical and scientific evaluations as may be appropriate regard-
ing the possible action that could be proposed by the World Health 
Organization respecting the drug or substance with respect to which a 
notice was transmitted under this subparagraph 
(B) Whenever the Secretary of State receives information that the 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs of the United Nations proposes to 
decide whether to add a drug or other substance to one of the 
schedules of the Convention, transfer a drug or substance from one 
schedule to another, or delete it from the schedules, the Secretary of 
State shall transmit timely notice to the Secretary of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare [Secretary of Health and Human Services] of such 
information who shall publish a summary of such information in the 
Federal Register and provide opportunity to interested persons to 
submit to him comments respecting the recommendation which he is 
to furnish, pursuant to this subparagraph, respecting such proposal 
The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare [Secretary of Health 
and Human Services] shall evaluate the proposal and furnish a 
recommendation to the Secretary of State which shall be binding on 
the representative of the United States in discussions and negotiations 
relating to the proposal 
(3) When the United States receives notification of a scheduling decision 
pursuant to article 2 of the Convention of Psychotropic Substances that 
a drug or other substance has been added or transferred to a schedule 
specified in the notification or receives notification (referred to in this 
subsection as a "schedule notice") that existing legal controls applicable 
under this title to a drug or substance and the controls required by the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act [21 USCS §§ 301 et seq ] do not 
meet the requirements of the schedule of the Convention in which such 
drug or substance has been placed, the Secretary of Health, Education, 
and Welfare [Secretary of Health and Human Services], after consulta-
tion with the Attorney General, shall first determine whether existing 
legal controls under this title applicable to the drug or substance and the 
controls required by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act [21 
USCS §§ 301 et seq ], meet the requirements of the schedule specified in 
the notification or schedule notice and shall take the following action 
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(A) If such requirements are met by such existing controls but the 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare [Secretary of Health and 
Human Services] nonetheless believes that more stringent controls 
should be applied to the drug or substance, the Secretary shall 
recommend to the Attorney General that he initiate proceedings for 
scheduling the drug or substance, pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) 
of this section, to apply to such controls 
(B) If such requirements are not met by such existing controls and 
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare [Secretary of Health 
and Human Services] concurs in the scheduling decision or schedule 
notice transmitted by the notification, the Secretary shall recommend 
to the Attorney General that he initiate proceedings for scheduling 
the drug or substance under the appropriate schedule pursuant to 
subsections (a) and (b) of this section 
(C) If such requirements are not met by such existing controls and 
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare [Secretary of Health 
and Human Services] does not concur in the scheduling decision or 
schedule notice transmitted by the notification, the Secretary shall— 
(1) if he deems that additional controls are necessary to protect the 
public health and safety, recommend to the Attorney General that 
he initiate proceedings for scheduling the drug or substance pursu-
ant to subsections (a) and (b) of this section, to apply such 
additional controls, 
(n) request the Secretary of State to transmit a notice of qualified 
acceptance, within the period specified in the Convention, pursuant 
to paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention, to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, 
(in) request the Secretary of State to transmit a notice of qualified 
acceptance as prescribed in clause (n) and request the Secretary of 
State to ask for a review by the Economic and Social Council of 
the United Nations, in accordance with paragraph 8 of article 2 of 
the Convention, of the scheduling decision, or 
(IV) in the case of a schedule notice, request the Secretary of State 
to take appropriate action under the Convention to initiate pro-
ceedings to remove the drug or substance from the schedules under 
the Convention or to transfer the drug or substance to a schedule 
under the Convention different from the one specified in the 
schedule notice 
(4)(A) If the Attorney General determines, after consultation with the 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare [Secretary of Health and 
Human Services], that proceedings initiated under recommendations 
made under paragraph [subparagraph] (B) or (C)(i) of paragraph (3) 
will not be completed within the time period required by paragraph 7 
of article 2 of the Convention, the Attorney General, after consulta-
tion with the Secretary and after providing interested persons oppor-
tunity to submit comments respecting the requirements of the tempo-
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rary order to be issued under this sentence, shall issue a temporary 
order controlling the drug or substance under schedule IV or V, 
whichever is most appropriate to carry out the minimum United 
States obligations under paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention 
As a part of such order, the Attorney General shall, after consultation 
with the Secretary, except such drug or substance from the applica-
tion of any provision of part C of this title [21 USCS §§ 821 et seq ] 
which he finds is not required to carry out the United States 
obligations under paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention In the 
case of proceedings initiated under subparagraph (B) of paragraph (3), 
the Attorney General, concurrently with the issuance of such order, 
shall request the Secretary of State to transmit a notice of qualified 
acceptance to the Secretary-General of the United Nations pursuant 
to paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention A temporary order 
issued under this subparagraph controlling a drug or other substance 
subject to proceedings initiated under subsections (a) and (b) of this 
section shall expire upon the effective date of the application to the 
drug or substance of the controls resulting from such proceedings 
(B) After a notice of qualified acceptance of a scheduling decision 
with respect to a drug or other substance is transmitted to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations in accordance with clause (n) 
or (in) of paragraph (3)(C) or after a request has been made under 
clause (iv) of such paragraph with respect to a drug or substance 
described in a schedule notice, the Attorney General, after consulta-
tion with the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare [Secretary 
of Health and Human Services] and after providing interested persons 
opportunity to submit comments respecting the requirements of the 
order to be issued under this sentence, shall issue an order controlling 
the drug or substance under schedule IV or V, whichever is most 
appropriate to carry out the minimum United States obligations under 
paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention in the case of a drug or 
substance for which a notice of qualified acceptance was transmitted 
or whichever the Attorney General determines is appropriate in the 
case of a drug or substance described in a schedule notice As a part 
of such order, the Attorney General shall, after consultation with the 
Secretary, except such drug or substance from the application of any 
provision of part C of this title [21 USCS §§ 821 et seq] which he 
finds is not required to carry out the United States obligations under 
paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention If, as a result of a review 
under paragraph 8 of article 2 of the Convention of the scheduling 
decision with respect to which a notice of qualified acceptance was 
transmitted in accordance with clause (n) or (in) of paragraph 
( 3 ) ( Q -
(l) the decision is reversed, and 
(n) the drug or substance subject to such decision is not required to 
be controlled under schedule IV or V to carry out the minimum 
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United States obligations under paragraph 7 of article 2 of the 
Convention, 
the order issued under this subparagraph with respect to such drug or 
substance shall expire upon receipt by the United States of the review 
decision If, as a result of action taken pursuant to action initiated 
under a request transmitted under clause (iv) of paragraph (3)(C), the 
drug or substance with respect to which such action was taken is not 
required to be controlled under schedule IV or V, the order issued 
under this paragraph with respect to bueh drug or substance shail 
expire upon receipt by the United States of a notice of the action 
taken with respect to such drug or substance under the Convention 
(C) An order issued under subparagraph (A) or (B) may be issued 
without regard to the findings required by subsection (a) of this 
section or by section 202(b) [21 USCS § 812(b)] and without regard to 
the procedures prescribed by subsection (a) or (b) of this section 
(5) Nothing in the amendments made by the Psychotropic Substances 
Act of 1978, or the regulations or orders promulgated thereunder shall 
be construed to preclude requests by the Secretary of Health, Education, 
and Welfare [Secretary of Health and Human Services] or the Attorney 
General through the Secretary of State, pursuant to article 2 or other 
applicable provisions of the Convention, for review of scheduling deci-
sions under such Convention, based on new or additional information 
(e) Immediate precursors. The Attorney General may, without regard to 
the findings required by subsection (a) of this section or section 202(b) [21 
USCS § 812(b)] and without regard to the procedures prescribed by 
subsections (a) and (b) of this section, place an immediate precursor in the 
same schedule in which the controlled substance of which it is an 
immediate precursor is placed or in any other schedule with a higher 
numencal designation If the Attorney General designates a substance as 
an immediate precursor and places it in a schedule, other substances shall 
not be placed in a schedule solely because they are its precursors 
(0 Abuse potential. If, at the time a new-drug application is submitted to 
the Secretary for any drug having a stimulant, depressant, or hallucino-
genic effect on the central nervous system, it appears that such drug has an 
abuse potential, such information shall be forwarded by the Secretary to 
the Attorney General 
(g) Non-narcotic substances sold over the counter without a prescription; 
dextromethorphan. (1) The Attorney General shall by regulation exclude 
any nonnarcotic substance from a schedule if such substance may, under 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act [21 USCS §§ 301 et seq], be 
lawfully sold over the counter without a prescription 
(2) Dextromethorphan shall not be deemed to be included in any 
schedule by reason of enactment of this title unless controlled after the 
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date of such enactment [enacted Oct 27, 1970] pursuant to the forego-
ing provisions of this section 
(Oct 27, 1970, P L 91-513, Title II, Part B, §201, 84 Stat 1245, Nov 
10, 1978, P L 95-633, Title I, § 102(a), 92 Stat 3769 ) 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
References in text: 
"This title", referred to in this section, is Title II of Act Oct 27, 1970, 
P L 9i 513, 84 Siat 1242, which appears generally as 21 USCS 
§§ 801 et seq For full classification of such Title, consult USCS Tables 
volumes 
"The effective date of this pan", referred to in this section, is Oct 27, 
1970, which is the effective date of Part B of Title II of Act Oct 27, 
1970, P L 91-513, as provided by § 704(b) of such Act, which appears 
as 21 USCS § 801 note "Schedule IV or V", referred to in this section, 
appears in 21 USCS § 812(c) 
"The Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978" referred to in this section, 
is Act Nov 10, 1978, P L 95-633, 92 Stat 3768, which amended this 
section, among other things for full classification of this Act, consult 
USCS Tables volumes 
Explanatory notes: 
The bracketed words "Secretary of Health and Human Services" are 
inserted on authonty of Act Oct 17, 1979, P L 96-88, Title V, § 509, 
93 Stat 695, which appears as 20 USCS § 3508, and which redesig-
nated the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare as the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services and provided that any reference to the 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, in any law in force on the 
effective date of such Act Oct 17, 1979, shall be deemed to refer and 
apply to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, except to the 
extent such reference is to a function or office transferred to the 
Secretary of Education or the Department of Education under such 
Act Oct 17, 1979 
The bracketed word "subparagraph" is inserted in subsec (d)(4)(A) of 
this section as the word probably intended by Congress 
Effective date of section: 
Act Oct 27, 1970, P L 91-513, Title II, Part G, § 704(b), 84 Stat 
1284, which appears as 21 USCS § 801 note, provided that this section 
is effective upon enactment on Oct 27, 1970 
Amendments: 
1978. Act Nov 10, 1978, in subsec (d), designated the existing 
provisions as para (1), and added paras (2)-(5) 
Other provisions: 
Effective date of 1978 amendment. Act Nov 10, 1978, P L 95-633, 
Title I, § 112, 92 Stat 3774, which appears as 21 USCS § 801a note, 
provided that the amendment of this section shall take effect on the 
date the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, signed at Vienna, 
Austria on February 21, 1971, enters into force in respect to the United 
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"Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, this subtitle [adding 21 USCS §971 and 
note and notes to § 801, and amending this section and 21 USCS §§ 830, 841, 842, 872, 
876, 881, 960, 961] shall take effect 120 days after the enactment of this Act.". 
RESEARCH GUIDE 
Federal Procedure L Ed: 
Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics, Fed Proc, L Ed §§ 35:665, 35:669. 
Forms: 
15 Federal Procedural Forms L Ed, Statutes of Limitation, and Other Time Limits § 61:32. 
7. "Marijuana" 
For purposes of 21 USCS § 801, et seq., mari-
juana is "controlled substance." United States v 
One 1977 36 Foot Cigarette Ocean Racer (1985, 
SD Fla) 624 F Supp 290. 
Conviction for possession with intent to distrib-
ute "quantity of hashish, substance containing 
tetrahydrocannabinol" will not be overturned, de-
spite defendants' argument that evidence was in-
sufficient to prove that what they possessed was 
controlled substance, and that variance between 
description of charge or drug possessed in indict-
ment and jury instructions and proof of charge or 
drug possessed presented at trial requires acquittal, 
because (1) even though actual seized substance or 
chemical analysis thereof was never adduced at 
trial, testimony by evidence technician who issued 
substance to undercover agents who sold it to 
defendants, by police officer present with drug dog 
at scene of arrest, and by forensic chemist who 
gave definitions of "hashish" and "sea-hash" was 
sufficient to show beyond reasonable doubt that 
substance seized from defendants was illegal "de-
rivative of marijuana" under 21 USCS §§812, 
802(16), and (2) defects in indictment and jury 
instructions which mistakenly characterized hash-
ish seized as "substance containing THC" instead 
of "derivative of marijuana" neither confused jury 
nor affected any substantial right of defendants so 
as to require upset of conviction under 21 USCS 
§ 841(a)(1). United States v McMahon (1987, DC 
Me) 673 F Supp 8. 
INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS 
Weight of marijuana plant stalks will not be 
considered for purposes of sentence enhancement 
under 21 USCS § 841(b)OXA) (vii), where mari-
juana was seized at stage before it was turned into 
readily marketable and consumable product and 
where 21 USCS §802(16) excludes stalks from 
definition of marijuana, because under "market 
approach" adopted by Congress in legislative his-
tory, enhanced penalties should only apply when 
all marijuana seized is marketable, and such inter-
pretation avoids inequity of penalizing individual 
with unmarketable marijuana same as individual 
with same amount of marketable marijuana. 
United States v Miller (1988, ED Tenn) 680 F 
Supp 1189. 
8. "Narcotic drug" 
In determining whether certain substance was 
opiate derivative drug enforcement agency admin-
istrator under 21 USCS §802, may consider the 
substance's pharmacological effects as aspect of 
definition of "derivative," and administrator's re-
jection of "2-step" definition of derivative in which 
it is said that substance is derivative of another 
only if it can be produced from it in only one or 2 
chemical operations, is sufficiently reasonable and 
consistent with the act's purposes to warrant judi-
cial deference, particularly considering the admin-j 
istrator's expertise in area. Reckitt & Colman, Ltd. 
v Administrator, Drug Enforcement Admin. 
(1986, App DC) 788 F2d 22. 
DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION 21 USCS § 
§ 811. Authority and criteria for classification of substances 
(a)-(f) [Unchanged] 
(g) Non-narcotic substances sold over the counter without a prescription; dextromethorphan.] 
(1), (2) [Unchanged] J 
(3) The Attorney General may, by regulation, exempt any compound, mixtur 
preparation containing a controlled substance from the application of all or any part oj 
this title if he finds such compound, mixture, or preparation meets the requirements oj 
one of the following categories: I 
(A) A mixture, or preparation containing a nonnarcotic controlled substance, whicM 
mixture or preparation is approved for prescription use, and which contains one oa 
more other active ingredients which are not listed in any schedule and which arJ 
included therein in such combinations, quantity, proportion, or concentration as tof 
vitiate the potential for abuse. 
(B) A compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any controlled substance] 
which is not for administration to a human being or animal, and which is packaged ill 
such form or concentration, or with adulterants or denaturants, so that as packaged i] 
does not present any significant potential for abuse. .,.-,,. I 
(h) Temporary scheduling of substance in schedule I to avoid imminent public safety hazard] 
(1) If the Attorney General finds that the scheduling of a substance in schedule I [2 
USCS § 812] on a temporary basis is necessary to avoid an imminent hazard to the publij 
safety, he may, by order and without regard to the requirements of subsection (b) relatinj 
to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, schedule such substance in schedule I [2] 
USCS § 812] if the substance is not listed in any other schedule in section 202 [21 
§ 812] or if no exemption or approval is in effect for the substance under section i 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act [21 USCS § 355]. Such an order may i 
issued before the expiration of thirty days from— 
(A) the date of the publication by the Attorney General of a notice in the F 
Register of the intention to issue such order and the grounds upon which such oi 
to be issued, and 
(B) the date the Attorney General has transmitted the notice required by para 
(4). 
(2) The scheduling of a substance under this subsection shall expire at the end of on 
from the date of the issuance of the order scheduling such substance, except th, 
Attorney General may, during the pendency of proceedings under subsection (aXl] 
respect to the substance, extend the temporary scheduling for up to six months. 
(3) When issuing an order under paragraph (1), the Attorney General shall be requi 
consider, with respect to the finding of an imminent hazard to the public safety, 
those factors set forth in paragraphs (4), (5), and (6) of subsection (c), including 
abuse, diversion from legitimate channels, and clandestine importation, manufactu 
distribution. 
(4) The Attorney General shall transmit notice of an order proposed to be issued 
paragraph (1) to the Secretary of Health and Human Services. In issuing an order 
paragraph (1), the Attorney General shall take into consideration any comments si 
ted by the Secretary in response to a notice transmitted pursuant to this paragraph. 
(5) An order issued under paragraph (1) with respect to a substance shall be vacated 
the conclusion of a subsequent rulemaking proceeding initiated under subsection (a 
respect to such substance. 
(6) An order issued under paragraph (1) is not subject to judicial review. 
(As amended Oct. 12, 1984, P. L. 98-473, Title II, Ch V, Part B, § 509(a), 98 Stat 2072 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
Amendments: 
1984. Act Oct. 12, 1984, in subsec. (g) added para. (3); and added subscc. (h). 
RESEARCH GUIDE 
Federal Procedure L Ed: 
Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics, Fed Proc, L Ed §§ 35:513, 35:540-545, 35:547-548, 35:629. 
Am Jun 
2 Am Jur 2d, Administrative Law § 395. 
INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS 6. Judicial review 
1. Constitutionality 
21 USCS § 811(h) is permissible delegation of 
congressional power and is not so arbitrary that it 
does not comport with due process, since tempo-
rary scheduling criteria are as specific as reason-
ably practicable to meet imminent threat to public 
safety while providing sufficient guidance, absence 
ot notice and public comment is permissible where 
temporary scheduling is emergency measure last-
ing at most 18 months, lengthy public comment 
would jeopardize public safety, and public hearings 
are held for consideration of permanent schedul-
ing, constitutionally imposed requirement of judi-
cial review would invalidate many statutes which 
preclude judicial review, harsh punishment of 
tnose distributing temporarily scheduled sub-
H * ? " n 0 t i rrat iona l raeans of reducing hazard, 
and determination of imminent threat to safety 
without scientific evaluation is reasonable basis for 
temporarily scheduling substances. United States v 
tmerson (1988, CA9 Cal) 846 F2d 541. 
2. Administrative procedures 
ti^drministrat ivc ru , e authorizing religious exemp-
tion tor use of marijuana may not be made under 
authority of 21 USCS §811; however, administra-
««- oi Drug Enforcement Administration is re-
quired to respond to petition for such a ru 
to inform petitioner that petition will i 
accepted because rule falls outside scope of 
Olsen v Drug Enforcement Admin. (1985, 
Fla) 776 F2d 267. 
Previous delegation of permanent schedui 
Attorney General to Administrator of DE> 
not delegate power to schedule drugs temp 
under 21 USCS § 811(h), since procedure ar 
of Administrator in temporary scheduling 
most entirely different than permanent schc 
under § 811(a), and failure of Congress or 
ney General to challenge or correct Adini 
tor's actions, or tacit approval of those acti 
not substitute for express delegation of aut 
United States v Emerson (1988, CA9 Cal) ft 
541. 
Guidelines under 21 USCS {811(h) arc 
ciently precise for delegation of legislative 
to Attorney General to temporarily add subt 
to Schedule I of Controlled Substances A 
USCS §§801 et seq.) if necessary to avoid 
nent hazard to public safety; thus, tern 
placement of 3.4 methylenedioxymethamphei 
(MDMA) on Schedule I by Drug Enfon 
Administration is permissible. United Sti 
Lichtman (1986, SD Fla) 636 F Supp 438. 
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eleven utilities which responded to the 
Notice argued that revocation of { 2 14 
would be in the public interest. 
Niagara-Mohawk Power Company 
stated that the same information is 
reported to the New York Energy Office, 
to the New York Public Service 
Commission as part of rate cases, and to 
the Electric Power Research Institute 
where it is catalogued and made 
available to the public. Georgia Power 
Company stated that the S 2.14 reports 
are redundant because of other reports 
required by other agencies. 
Consolidated Edison Company of New 
York noted its belief that reports filed 
under this section were not susceptible 
to use as a basis for Commission 
findings. 
Effective Date 
This rule is to be elective January 1, 
1980. 
(Federal Power Art as amended 16 U.S.C. 
792-828i:, Department of Energy Organization 
Art. 40 U.S.C. 7101 7352. E.O. 12009. 42 FR 
4«2«7) 
In consideration of the foregoing, Part 
2. Subchapter A of Chapter I, Title 18. 
Code of Federal Regulations is hereby 
amended as set forth below, effective 
January 1. 1980. 
By the Commission. 
Kenneth F. Plumb, 
Srcrvtary. 
§2.14 (Revoked) 
Section 2.14 is revoked. 
|KR Hoc 7lt lt*m Ft'«d IMI-79. *4S «m) 
•4LLINQ COOf ttSfr-O t-H 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
Drug Enforcement Administration 
21 CFR Part 1306 
Schedules of Controlled Substances; 
Schedule II Placement of 
Phenylacetone; (Phenyl-2-propanone, 
P2P, benzyl methyl ketone, methyl 
benzyl ketone) 
AOIMCV: Drug Enforcement 
Administration. Justice. 
ACTION; Final Order. 
SUMMARY: This is a T trial Order issued 
by the Administrator of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration placing the 
substance, phenylacetone. also known 
as phenyl 2 propamine, benzyl methyl 
ketone methyl benzyl ketone and P2P, 
into Schedule II of the Controlled 
Substances Act. This action results from 
th»* increasing evidence of use of 
phenylacetone H $ I major immediate 
chemical precursor to methamphetamine 
and amphetamine in their illicit 
clandestine synthesis. The effect of the 
present Order provides regulatory 
controls upon the manufacture, 
distribution, dispensing, Importation and 
exportation of this immediate precursor 
to methamphetamine and amphetamine. 
IrTlCTtVI DAT! OF SCHIOUUIII 
CONTROL: February 11,1980, except as 
otherwise provided in 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 
Section of this Order. 
FOR FURTM1R INFORMATION CONTACT: 
Howard McClain, Jr., Chief, Regulatory 
Control Division, Drug Enforcement 
Administration, Telephone: 202-633-
1366. 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In 
enacting the Controlled Substances Act 
in 1970, Congress provided in Section 
201(e) of the Act a mechanism for 
allowing the Attorney General to place a 
drug or chemical iuto a schedule of 
control without the requirement of first 
obtaining a medical and scientific 
evaluation and recommendation from 
the Secretary of Health, Education, and 
Welfare, without having to make 
findings of his own on abuse and public 
health risk, or concerning the schedule 
considered, and without the need to 
provide an opportunity for a rulemaking 
hearing on the record in accordance 
with the Administrative Procedures Act 
(5 U.S.C. 551-559). In lieu of these 
procedures otherwise required for the 
traditional scheduling of drugs or other 
substances, Congress allowed the 
Attorney General to schedule a drug or 
substance if it was found by him to be 
an immediate piecurlor as defined in 
Section 102(22) of the Act. That section 
provides as follows: 
The term "immediate precursor" 
means a substance—(A) Which the 
Attorney General has found to be and 
by regulation designated as being the 
principal compound used, or produced 
primarily for use, in the manufacture of 
a controlled substance; (B) Which is an 
immediate chemical intermediary useo 
or likrlv to be used in the manufacture 
of sin I trolled substance: and (C) 
The conn >i of which is necessary to 
prevent, curtail, or limit the manufacture 
of such controlled substance. 
In establishing this alternative 
scheduling procedure, Congress 
intended to dispense with the formal, 
and sometimes lengthy, administrative 
regulatory rulemaking process in cases 
where the risk was that clandestine 
laboratories were making controlled 
substances with < hemicals which 
themselves were not controlled, but 
whir.h were one step removed from 
fur?iH-.'/ rut or becoming the controlled 
subMUiruvn illicitly manufactured. 
Congress recognized the need for this 
summary scheduling mechanism as it 
considered testimony provided to the 
House Select Committee on Crime, 91st 
Congress, 2nd Session, 1970-1971, (H. 
Rept. No. 91-1807, p. 25-6). which stated 
that entrepreneurs willing to set up 
clandestine laboratories to manufacture 
amphetamine and methamphetamine 
would find easy manufacture and 
realize high profits. 
DEA's own investigations have 
documented 268 illicit 
methamphetamine and 45 illicit 
amphetamine laboratories, seized from 
1975 to November 1979. More important, 
the illlicit methamphetamine 
laboratories seized in the first eleven 
months of this year is 106, compared 
with 11 seized in all of 1975. These 
statistics appear more alarming when 
one considers that DEA's enforcement 
effort obviously cannot account for 100% 
of the illicit laboratories in operation. 
Better control by DEA over this illicit 
activity could be obtained if essential 
ingredients used in the illicit 
manufacture of methamphetamine and 
amphetamine were regulated as are the 
end-products—controlled substances. 
DEA's investigations have shown that 
at least three out of four 
methamphetamine laboratories seized 
since 1976 made, purchased or used 
phenylacetone in one of two synthetic 
methamphetamine manufacturing 
processes. Of those, the more popular 
process to make methamphetamine is 
the reductive amination of 
phenylacetone with methylamine in 
ethanol with aluminum foil and mercuric 
chloride catalysts. The second 
mentioned process to make 
methamphetamine is designated as the 
Leuckart synthesis where phenylacetone 
is heated with formic acid and 
methylamine and hydrolyzed with 
hydrochloric acid. Both processes can 
produce amphetamine if methylamine is 
simply replaced by ammonia (salts). 
DEA laboratories have analyzed seized 
samples of methamphetamine and 
amphetamine of illicit manufacture and 
have identified in those samples trace 
amounts of phenylacetone. 
These investigations and laboratory 
analyses support the conclusion that 
most of the illicit methamphetamine and 
amphetamine produced by clandestine 
laboratories resulted from their use of 
phenylacetone as an essential ingredient 
in the process. 
Other trace substances have been 
found in the above-mentioned 
methamphetamine and amphetamine 
samples seized and analyzed. The trace 
substances have been identified as by-
products of syntheses and side reactions 
where phenylace»»oe or its pret.u»sor. 
fwd&nA lUgbtf / Vol 44, No. 240 / Wedneedey, December 12, 1979 / Ralea and Regulations 7U23 
phenylacetlc acid w n an essential 
ingredient. This further establishes an 
additional concern that illicit 
'^oratories, manufacturing 
<nrthamphetamine and amphetamine, in 
tome cases made, rather than 
purchased, their own pheylacetone This 
capability drives the exposure ot illicit 
laboratory activity deeper from law 
enforcement's view by replacing the 
marketplace transaction of purchasing 
phtmytacetone with the hidden activity 
of making it 
Currently, the Drug Enforcement 
Administration relies upon its Precursor 
Liaison Program to identify excessive or 
suspicious sa'as, by manufacturers and 
wholesalers to questionable purchaser* 
of chemicals for their likely use in the 
illicit manufacture of controlled 
substances. Participating in this program 
are at least one manufacturer and 
numerous wholesalers of phenylacetone. 
However, participation is voluntary, and 
in the face of dramatically rising 
numbers of seizures of illicit 
methamphetarnine and amphetamine 
laboratories in recent years, the obvious 
present need calls for requiring, not 
requesting, sales and distribution 
records and reports, security measures 
and import restrictions, to control this 
essential chemical used in the illicit 
manufacture of methamphetarnine and 
amphetamine. 
Such requirements would include 
DEA registration of purchasers and 
sellers of phenylacetone. and likely 
would result in diminishing the 
unhindered sales transactions now 
occ urrina. 
Therefore, in view of the foregoing, 
the Administrator of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration hereby 
finds in accordance with Section 102(22) 
of the Act (21 U S.C 802(22)). that 
phenylacetone: 
(1) Is the principal compound used, or 
pioduced primarily for use. in the 
manufacture of the Schedule I! 
controlled substances 
methamphetarnine or amphetamine. 
(2) Is an immediate chemical 
intermediary used or likely to be used in 
the manufacture of such substances, and 
(3) The control of which is necessary 
to prevent, curtail or limit the 
manufacture of such controlled 
subetances. 
Therefore, phenylacetone is an 
immediate precursor" of 
methamphetarnine and amphetamine at 
defined in Section 102(22) of the Act (21 
I S C 802(22)) and thus may be placed 
in Schedule II M* are methamphetarnine 
and amphetamM>t». wttmtut the necessity 
of makins the findings otherwise 
required by Sections 201(a) end 202fb) of 
the Act (21 U S C 611(a) and W2(b}) and 
without regard to the procedures 
otherwise required by Section 161(a) 
and (b) of the Act (21 U.8.C. t l l (a) end 
(b)) Such procedures which, under the 
authority ol Section 201(e) of the Act (21 
U.SC 811(e)). peed not be required in 
controlling immediate precursors, 
Include the rulemaking procedures ea 
set forth in the Administrative 
Procedures Act (I U A C 531-460). and 
the opportunity for a hearing on the 
record. 
Therefore, the Administrator of the 
Drug Enforcement Administration 
hereby dispenses with issuing Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, and the 
opportunity for a hearing on the record, 
and issues this Final Order piecing 
phenylacetone into Schedule II of the 
Act as an immediate precursor to 
methamphetarnine and amphetamine, 
out of high regard for the need for 
prompt controls over phenylacetone 
without undue delay, which effective 
amphetamine and methamphetarnine 
control demands, and in recognition of 
the statutory authority to regulate 
precursors expeditiously in any event 
Even so. the Administrator is 
establishing the dates on which the First 
Schedule II controls shall be imposed 
upon the legitimate manufacture, 
distribution, dispensing, importation, 
and exportation of phenylacetone to be 
no sooner than February 11. I960. 
Within this two month period between 
publication of this Order and the first 
effective dates imposing regulatory 
controls for phenylacetone, ell 
interested persons may submit 
comments and objections related to the 
issue whether, and to what extent the 
required compliance by industry with 
Schedule II controls will or might likely 
hinder tbeir legitimate manufacturing 
and sales activities with phenylacetone 
so as to outweigh the expected benefit 
to result from Schedule II placement of 
phenylacetone in curbing illicit 
manufacture of methamphetarnine and 
amphetamine The Administrator 
affords this opportunity for comment 
notwithstanding that he has earlier 
asked for comments by interested 
persons on this same i* me (40 FR 47525. 
October 9,1975). In r» •-.»• nse thereto, 
twenty nine letters wejt- M-« t ived and 
the general nature of them was that 
phenylfl'f tone is used in the 
pharma* > Meal industry to make 
amphetamine and amphetamine like 
products, and minimally in research. 
Most respondents stated phenylacetone 
w HZ rmt ufirff fr> *h*ir imhutriel 
processes, which included rubber 
proc essing and the manufacture of 
chemicals Five opposed control citing 
that additional recordkeeping and 
security measures could be burdensome 
The Administrator, however, iateods 
to learn how Industry would currently 
regard this present control action, and 
for this reason, is offering the sixty day 
comment period established by this 
Order. 
Should the Administrator receive 
comments or objections on the 
aforementioned issue which raise 
significant questions on the ability of 
industry to comply with Schedule II 
controls for phenylacetone. he shell 
immediately suspend the effectiveness 
of this Order as it relates to this 
imposition of Schedule II regulatory 
controls until he may reconsider that 
portion of this Order in light of such 
comments and objections so filed. 
Thereafter, he may reinstate, revoke or 
amend this Order as he determines is 
appropriate. 
Comments should be submitted in 
quintuplicate to the Administrator. Drug 
Enforcement Administration. United 
States Department of Justice. 14001 
Street. NW\ Washington, DC. 20637, 
Attention: DEA Federal Register 
Representative. Dated* December 7, 
1979. 
Therefore, pursuant to 21 U.S.C 811(e) 
and regulations of the Drug Enforcement 
Administration and of the Department 
of Justice, the Administrator of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration hereby 
orders that phenylacetone be Included 
in Schedule II of the Act. and that 
11306.12 of Title 21. Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR) be amended by 
creating a new subsection (f). 
designated Immediate precursors, and 
including therein phenylacetone aa set 
forth below. Additionally, the 
Administrator takes the present 
opportunity to make a non-substantive 
change in the listing of other immediate 
precursors, by removing 1 
phenylcyclohcxylaminc, and 1-
piperidinocyclohexanecarbonitrile 
(PCD), which are immediate precursors 
to phencyclidine (PCP), from where they 
currently appear in subsection (e) 
(DepressHiita) of | 1308.12 and re listing 
them in the new subsection (f). and by 
re-numbering Secobarbital as Item (5) in 
| t m i 2 ( e ) . 
130*12 totissttNIt 
• • • • • 
(f) Immediate precursors Unless 
specifically excepted or unless listed in 
another schedule, any material, 
compound, mixture, or preparation 
which contains any quantity of the 
following substances: 
(1) Immediate precursor to 
amphetamine and methamphetarnine: 
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(i) Phenylacetone—S501 
Some trade or other names: phenyI-2-
propanonr, P2P; benzyl methyl ketone; 
methyl benzyl ketone; 
(2) Immediate precursors to 
phencyclidine (PCP): 
(i) 1-phenylcyclohexylamine—7460 
(ii) 1-piperidinocyclohexanecarbonithle 
(PCQ-eeo3 
Effective Dates 
1. Registration. Any person who 
manufactures, distributes, dispenses, 
import* or exports phenlyacetone or 
who proposes to engage in such 
activities, shall submit an application 
for registration to conduct such 
activities in accordance with Parts 1301 
and 1311 of Title 21 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations on or before 
February 11,1980. Applications for 
registration should be sent by registered 
mail, return receipt requested, to: United 
States Department of Justice, Drug 
Enforcement Administration, 
Registration Section, P.O. Box 28083, 
Central Station, Washington, D.C. 20005. 
2. Security. Phenylacetone must be 
manufactured, distributed and stored in 
accordance with i§ 1301.71,1301.72(a), 
(c), and (d), 1301.73.13O1.74(aH0. 
1301.75{bMc) and 1331.76 of Title 21 of 
the Code of Federal Regulations on or 
before June 12,1980. From now until the 
effective date of this revision, it is 
expected that manuiacturera and 
distributors of phenylacetone will 
initiate whatever preparations as may 
be necessary, including undertaking 
handling and engineering studies and 
construction programs, in order to 
provide adequate security for 
phenylacetone in accordance with DEA 
regulations so that substantial 
compliance with this provision can be 
met by June 12.1980. In the event that 
this imposes special hardships, the Drug 
Enforcement Administration will 
entertain any justified requests for 
extensions of time. 
3. Labeling and Packaging. All labels 
on commercial containers of, and all 
labeling of phenylacetone packaged 
after June 12.1980. shall comply with the 
requirements of fg 1302.03-1302.05 and 
1302 08 of Title 21 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations. In the event this effective 
date imposes special hardships on any 
manufacturer, as defined in Section 
102(14) of the Controlled Substances Act 
(21 U.S.C. 802(14)), the Drug 
Enforcement Administration will 
entertain any justified requests for an 
extension of time. 
4. Inventory Every registrant required 
to keep records who possesses any 
quantity of phenylacetone shall take an 
inventory pursuant to J J 1304.11-1304.19 
of Title 21 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations, cf all stocks of such 
substance on hand on February 11,1980. 
5. Records. All registrants required to 
keep records pursuant to H 1304.21* 
1304.27 of Title 21 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations shall maintain such records 
on phenylacetone commencing on the 
date on which the inventory of such 
substance is taken. 
8. Reports. All registrants required to 
file reports with the Drug Enforcement 
Administration pursuant to 88 1304.37-
1304.41 of Title 21 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations shall report on the inventory 
taken under paragraph 4 above and on 
all subsequent transactions. 
7. Order Forms. The order form 
requirements of 88 1305.01-1305.18 of 
Tide 21 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations shall be in effect on the date 
which the initial inventory of this 
Schedule II controlled substance is 
taken, March 11,1980. 
8. Quotas. Quotas shall be established 
in 1980 for phenylacetone pursuant to 
8 8 1303.01-1303.37 of Title 21 of the 
Code of Federal Regulations. 
Applications for procurement quotas 
and manufacturing quotas should be 
submitted not later than February 11, 
198a 
9. Importation and Exportation. All 
importation and exportation of 
phenylacetone shall, on or after 
February 11,1980, be required to be in 
compliance with Part 1312 of Title 21 of 
the Code of Federal Regulations. 
10. Criminal Liability. The 
Administrator, Drug Enforcement 
Administration, hereby orders that any 
activity with respect to phenylacetone 
as a Schedule II controlled substance 
not authorized by, or in violation of, the 
Controlled Substances Act or the 
Controlled Substances Import and 
Export Act, conducted after February 11, 
1980, shall be unlawful, except that any 
person who is not now registered to 
handle phenylacetone as a Schedule II 
controlled substance but who is entitled 
to registration under such Acts may 
continue to conduct normal business or 
professional practice with 
phenylacetone between the date on 
which this Order is published and the 
date which he obtains or is denied 
registration: provided, that application 
for such registration is submitted on or 
before February 11,1980. 
11. Other. In all other respects, this 
Order is effective February 11,1980. 
Dated: December 7,1979. 
Peter B. Bensinfer, 
Administrator, Drug Enforcement 
Administration. 
(FR Doc 7S-M114 PlUd 1 a-11-7ft 846 am] 
MUJNQ COM 4410-OS-M 
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND 
URBAN DEVELOPMENT 
Offic* of Assistant Sscrstary for 
Housing—FsdersI Housing 
Commlsslonsr 
24 CFR Part 207 
(Docket No. R-79-754] 
Amsndmsnts to Part 207 To Changs 
ths Minimum Numbsr of Units 
Required for Projects Insured Under 
Section 207 of the National Housing 
Act 
AGENCY: Department of Housing and 
Urban Development, Office of the 
Assistant Secretary for Housing— 
Federal Housing Commissioner. 
ACTION: Final rule. 
SUMMARY: Sections 207.24 (a) and (b) 
and 207.32a of Subpart A are being 
amended to reflect the change from 8 to 
5 in the minimum number of units 
required for projects insured under 
section 207 of the National Housing Act 
as authorized by the Housing and 
Community Development Amendments 
of 1978. 
EFFECTIVE DATE: January 2,1880. 
ADDRESS: Rules Docket Clerk, Office of 
the General Counsel, Room 5218, 
Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, 451 Seventh Street SW-
Washington, D.C 20410. 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 
George O. Hipps, Jr., Office of 
Multifamily Housing Development 
Room 8128, 451 Seventh Street SW„ 
Washington, D.C. 20410; Phone: (202) 
755-5720. (This is not a toll free number.) 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Section 
207 of the National Housing Act has 
required that a multifamily project or a 
mobile home park have a minimum of 
eight units to be eligible for mortgage 
insurance. This minimum number was 
changed to five by the Housing and 
Community Development Amendments 
of 1978 enacted October 27,197a With 
this change, proposed projects of 5, 8, 
and 7 units will be eligible for mortgage 
insurance. Existing multifamily 
apartment housing projects of five to 
seven units will also be eligible under 
tart 207 pursuant to section 223(f) of ths 
National Housing Act. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are ins t ruc ted t h a t under the laws of the State of Utah 
Phenyl-2-Propanone, or P-2-P, i s not a control led subs tance . How-
ever , i f a subs tance has been lawful ly made a control led subs tance 
under the Federal Controlled Substances Act, then i t i s control led 
under the Utah Controlled Substances Act. 
Therefore, if the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt: 
A: 1. That the United Sta tes Attorney General by ru l e 
scheduled the subs tance P-2-P or Phenyl-2-Propa-
none as a control led subs t ance ; 
2. That the United Sta tes Attorney General made a 
f inding, after a h e a r i n g in accordance with his 
ru lemaking procedures , which a t l e a s t allowed for 
a hea r ing on the record , t h a t P-2-P has a potent ia l 
for abuse; 
3 . That the United States Attorney General found t h a t 
t h e subs tance P-2-P: 
a. Has a po ten t ia l for abuse less t h a n the drugs 
on schedules I and I I ; 
b . Has a c u r r e n t l y accepted medical use in t r e a t -
ment in the United Sta tes ; and 
c . Abuse of the subs t ance may lead to moderate 
or low phys ica l dependence or high psychological 
dependence; and 
4 . That notice of s a i d act ion was proper ly publ ished in 
in the Federa l Register and the Code of Federal Reg-
ula t ions . ; or 
B: Txhat the United States Attorney General proper ly found, 
p u r s u a n t to a hea r ing and i n accordance with h is r u l e -
making au thor i ty , t h a t P-2-P was an immediate p recurser 
in t h a t : 
a . the Attorney General has found i t to be and by 
regu la t ion des igna ted as being the pr incipal compound 
used, or produced p r imar i l y for use, i n the manu-
facture of a control led subs tance ; 
b . I t i s an immediate chemical in te rmediary used or 
l ike ly to be used i n the manufacture of a con t ro l l ed 
subs tance ; and 
c. The control of which is is necessary to prevent 
cur tai l , or limit the manufacture of such controlled 
substance. 
then you may determine tha t the substance P-2-P or Pheny 1-2-Propa-
none is a controlled substance under Utah Law. 
- 2 -
it 
INSTRUCTION NO . ^ 
You are instructed that Phenyl-2-Propanone or 
P2P is a controlled substance under the laws of the State of 
Utah. 
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